I am motivated by some of the critical responses which the Buffy the Vampire Slayer and Philosophy book received. It's not that I want to have the last word (well, not just that), but that I think several of the critics shared a common--and interesting--misconception: they thought that the project was one of reading Buffy the Vampire Slayer as philosophy, and then criticized us, either for not doing justice to this high calling, or for ever imagining that such a silly project was achievable. But I never thought that was what we were trying to do: I saw the project as that of doing philosophy for its own sake, but with an inspiration drawn from Buffy the Vampire Slayer. One might represent the contrast as the philosophical hermeneutics of Buffy vs. the buffyological heuristics of philosophy.

I want to make this distinction explicit and show how it can be used to clarify discussion of some contested issues in Buffy studies. In particular, complaints (such as those raised in the closing panel at "Blood, Text & Fears") that insufficient attention has been paid to the context of production and that supposedly academic readings are too uncritical and "fannish" may be fair if the intention was the first species of enquiry (a philosophical reading of Buffy the Vampire Slayer), but are beside the point if the second is intended (philosophy inspired by Buffy the Vampire Slayer). I illustrate this distinction by discussing some passages of Buffy scholarship exemplifying the two types.

The resolution of this problem leads to some deeper and richer questions, for which I do not pretend to have complete answers. For instance, what is it for something to count as a source of philosophical inspiration without itself being philosophy? And how does this relate to the "philosophical imaginary" (cf.  Michele Le Doeuff)?

In the Buffverse, the soul is used to distinguish human from inhuman and good from evil. Yet the series offers examples that make a coherent ontology of the soul difficult. I propose that the soul, if defined functionally, is equivalent to internalized authority. When vampires sire one another, the sired is supposed to lose her soul. The memories of the previous inhabitant remain, but all else is supposed to leave. Vampire-Willow, however, is a lesbian. This is a defining characteristic of Willow’s personality. Spike has a connection to William’s mother that one would not expect a demon to have. Harmony still feels concern for her best friend Cordelia. Even without souls they maintain personality traits unique to the body they inhabit. The soul is therefore not the root of personality.

So what does the soul do? Its only unique function is conscience, guilt or remorse; and these in accordance with contemporary ethical norms. The soul in the Buffyverse is, therefore, substantial since it does possess the body, but it is only internalized authority. If this is so, what is Spike’s chip other than an artificial soul equivalent to the disciplinary action of a parent? If the soul is substantial internalized authority, and if the soul is what is supposed to make one who one is, then what does this say about the nature of humanity? Is the person merely the aggregate of their social relations, internalized norms? Is there more to the person? Buffy suggests as much when even without friends…she maintains that she still is Buffy. Through the problem of the soul in Buffy the Vampire Slayer, I intend to investigate the nature of selfhood.